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Cyborg Moth's War on Terror: The Fourth





Imagine meeting an old and trusted friend for coffee at an outdoor caf6
or for a stroll in a quiet park. In the comfortable context of such a get-
together, the conversation can roam over just about any subject that comes to
mind, whether of family or fantasy, no matter how trivial or personal. Your
friendship enables you to let down your guard and reveal your true self, to try
out new ideas, or even to play devil's advocate in some pleasant debate.
During your intimate discussion, a moth happens to alight on a nearby table
or bench. In response, your friend suddenly stiffens, places her finger to her
lips and says, "Let's change the subject to something safer; that moth might
be after us." Realizing that she is not joking, your friend's behavior strikes
you as so bizarre that it crosses your mind that your friend might be suffering
through some acutely stressful time-trouble at work, at home, or of health.
You even consider whether your trusted confidant is experiencing paranoid
delusions.
Or, perhaps, your friend is correct. A well-funded department of the
United States federal government, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) of the Department of Defense,' is investing millions of
dollars2 in an effort to insert electronics into moths and other insects.3
DARPA hopes that the resulting insect "cyborgs" will enable the U.S. to
fight terrorists, even in remote terrorist training camps in places such as the
"hills of northern Pakistan."4 Mandyam Srinivasan, professor of visual
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t. Jonathan Richards, Can Cyborg Moths Bring Down Terrorists?, TIMES ON-
LINE, May 24, 2007, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech-and_
web/article 1831494.ece?.
2. DARPA's Microsystems Technology Office (MTO) "has devoted more than
US $2 million to the Hybrid Insect MEMS (HI-MEMS) program." Roland
Piquepaille's Technology Trends: How New Technologies Are Modifying Our
Way of Life, Autonomous Insect Cyborg Sentinels, June 22, 2007, http://www.
primidi.com/2007/06/22.html.
3. R. Colin Johnson, Insect Cyborgs Go Undercover, http://www.tectrends.coml
cgi/showan?an=00t68087. (last visited July 26, 2008).
4. Richards, supra note 1.
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neuroscience at the University of Queensland, envisions the cyborgs flying
"inside buildings, entering through windows and doors inconspicuously,"
and taking movies and recording sounds while perching unsuspected on a
wall.5 Whatever intrusions moths could perform on terrorists could also be
turned upon citizens. Thus, these insects could "be used in a variety of mili-
tary and homeland security applications," including detecting explosives,
toxins, or drugs as well as potentially hunting down robbers.6
Combining such powerful technology with common bugs could poten-
tially implicate privacy and search and seizure issues under the Fourth
Amendment.7 This article examines the potential impact of cyborg moth
technology on the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches.
Part II explores the progress and abilities of DARPA's cyborg moth technol-
ogy. Part III reviews the historical background of the Fourth Amendment
"search." Part IV focuses on the potential concerns created by DARPA's
cyborg moths.
II. THE NEW CYBORG MOTH SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
The U.S. government is actively pursuing a plan to create "cyborg
moths" that will enable the military to investigate, and possibly attack, ter-
rorists.8 Scientists create moth cyborgs by implanting a computer chip in a
moth's body while it is still a pupa in the cocoon, relying on the insect's
natural development to surround the implant with its own flesh.9 The chip
can remotely control the moth's entire nervous system, allowing the insect to
land in a "camp without arousing suspicion, all the while beaming video and
other information back to its masters via what its developers refer to as a
'reliable tissue-machine interface.'"o As mentioned, the terrorist-fighting
moth is one particular project being researched by DARPA."'
DARPA, an agency created in 1958 months after the Soviet launch of
Sputnick, describes its hybrid insect microelectromechanical systems (HI-
5. Richard Macey, The Name's Bogong - James Bogong, THE SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Oct. 13, 2007, http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/the-names-
bogong-james-bogong/2007/10/12/I 191696173795.html.
6. Bill Christensen, Implants Create Insect Cyborgs, LiVE SCIENCE, Feb. 4, 2008,
http://www.livescience.com/strangenews/080204-cyborg-insect.html.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized").
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MEMS) program as merely a continuation of humanity's previous reliance
on animals, reasoning that the:
Animal world has provided mankind with locomotion over
millennia. For example we have used horses and elephants for lo-
comotion in wars and conducting commerce. Birds have been
used for sending covert messages, and to detect gases in coal
mines, a life-saving technique for coal miners.12
DARPA's HI-MEMS program, which is "aimed at developing tightly cou-
pled machine-insect interfaces by placing micro-mechanical systems inside
the insects during the early stages of metamorphosis," is considered to be
akin to humanity's use of "saddles and horseshoes" needed for "horse loco-
motion control."3 Such "intimate control" of insects by "embedded
microsystems" enables a scientist to harness an animal's own locomotion
system, and thus benefit from millions of years of evolutionary progress.' 4
In 2006, DARPA solicited research in HI-MEMS that would exploit the
"healing processes from one metamorphic stage to the next," which would be
an improvement over earlier systems that were attached to adult insects
through adhesive bonds.'5 Although the agency preferred flying insects, such
as moths or dragonflies, DARPA would also consider insects that hopped or
swam.16 Such bugs would be steered by "electronic remote control" or GPS
and would carry "gas sensors, microphones, video, etc."'7
If hijacking another being's body to spy on adversaries sounds inspired
by science fiction, there is good reason for this. In fact, the director of HI-
MEMS, Dr. Amit Lal, read Thomas Easton's 1990 novel, Sparrowhawk,
which "imagine[d] bioengineering-enlarged birds and insects used as beasts
of burden."18 In Sparrowhawk, Easton envisioned "implanting computer
chips into genetically engineered insects and other animals," to create birds
that serve as airliners and beetles that grow into automobiles.9 Intrigued by
Easton's ideas, DARPA invited Easton to speak at the "kickoff meeting" for
the HI-MEMS program.20 In his online presentation, Easton speculated
about the tasks that insect cyborgs could fulfill in the future, such as gather-
12. Amit Lal, Hybrid Insect MEMS (HI-MEMS), http://www.darpa.mil/MTO/
programs/himems/index.html (last visited July 26, 2008).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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ing intelligence, penetrating secret meetings, tracking targets, and retrieving
samples.21 Easton even suggested that law enforcement use cyborg moths:
"Moths are extraordinarily sensitive to sex attractant, so instead of giving
bank robbers money treated with dye, [police] could use sex attractant in-
stead. Then, a moth-based HI-MEMS could find the robber by following the
scent."22
The daring HI-MEMS project fits with the culture of DARPA, whose
mission, in part, is "to develop imaginative, innovative and often high-risk
research ideas offering a significant technological impact that will go well
beyond the normal evolutionary developmental approaches."23 The Depart-
ment of Defense Directive 5134.10 provides that "DARPA shall serve as the
central research and development organization of the Department of Defense
with a primary responsibility to maintain U.S. technological superiority over
potential adversaries."24 Therefore, DARPA scientists and engineers have the
responsibility to pursue "hard problems" or the "unobtainiums."25 DARPA's
ambition has led to some failures, such as a mechanical elephant meant to
negotiate the jungles of Vietnam, building an "infectious polio virus from its
chemical components," and the "Total Information Awareness Project,"
which was intended to ferret out terrorists by mining credit card and com-
puter-use data.26 Yet such bold thinking also led to a string of major accom-
plishments. Emphasis on innovation, along with a budget of as much as $3.1
billion annually, has helped DARPA make contributions to the Saturn rocket,
the M-16 rifle, the stealth fighter, the Global Positioning System, the
21. Id.
22. Id. The science fiction aspect of DARPA's HI-MEMS program has already
attracted some ridicule. The Register, whose motto is "Biting the Hand that
Feeds IT," reported, "[flor now DARPA only aims to manufacture chipped
moths, which it reckons to send into suspected terrorist facilities (presumably
including al-Qaeda linen cupboards - that'll show them)." Lewis Page, DARPA
to Create Brain-Chipped Cyborg Moths, THE REGISTER, May 31, 2007, http://
www. theregister. co. uk/200705/31/cyborg-chipped terminatormothsaiee/.
Likewise, a posting on the blog titled "The Incontiguous Brick" joked that,
"[u]nfortunately, terrorists may have already developed a method to fight this
bug-based threat . . . moth balls." The Incontiguous Brick, May 25, 2007,
http://incontiguousbrick.com/2007/05/25/terrorists 
- have - new - technology-to-
defeat-cyborg-moth.
23. AMIT LAL, HYBRID INSECT MEMS PROPOSER'S DAY 1 (2006), www.darpa.mil/
MTO/solicitations/baa06-22/pdf/lal-proposersday.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Hurst, supra note 12, at 2.
26. Id. at 3-4.
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Predator drone, the Hubble telescope,27 high-energy lasers, and night-vision
goggles.28
To assist its HI-MEMS program, DARPA has awarded funding to re-
search groups at the University of Michigan, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT), and Boyce Thompson Institute.29 According to a DARPA
spokesperson, the University of Michigan research group has focused on
horned beetles, while the groups at MIT and Boyce Thompson are working
on large moths.30 Meanwhile, several scientists at Cornell University have
written papers describing their progress inserting a microprobe into the to-
bacco hawkmoth, Manduca sexta. 3 1 The Cornell scientists' first experiments
were designed to overcome previous difficulties encountered when payloads
were either strapped onto the adult insect like backpacks or were bonded to
their body surface with adhesive.32 Perceiving these attachments as "foreign
weights," the insects tried to get rid of the payloads that were superficially
attached to their bodies.33 The scientists at Cornell sought to avoid this prob-
lem by surgically inserting "microsystems in the pupal stage (an early stage
of metamorphosis) when the insect was immobile."34 These surgeries eventu-
ally created "an adult moth with the platform/silicone-piece permanently at-
tached onto the insect as the adult had healed over the inserted artifacts."35
Not only did the resulting moths perceive the implant as part of their own
body weight instead of extra or foreign weight, but the survival rates of these
moths were comparable to those of normal unaltered moths. 36 The Cornell
scientists also noted that the "new tissue interface" could eventually lead to
the development of devices that "could be integrated into the insect tissue
system like muscles or nerves to control the insect's behavior (movement)."37
Such movement could be manipulated by "pheromones, changes in wave-
27. LAL, supra note 23.
28. Daniel Engber, I Want to Be a Mad Scientist, SLATE, Aug. 8, 2007, http:/www.
slate.com/id/2 17 1923/entry/2 17 1925/.
29. Johnson, supra note 3.
30. Id.
31. Alper Bozkurt et al., Microprobe Microsystem Platform Inserted During Early
Metamorphosis to Actuate Insect Flight Muscle; Ayesa Paul et al., Surgically
Implanted Micro-Platforms in Manduca Sexta Moths; A. Bozkurt et al., MEMS
Based Bioelctronic Neuromuscular Interfaces for Insect Cyborg Flight
Control.





37. Paul et al., supra note 31, at 1.
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length of light, and to various frequencies of ultrasound."8 Further, like any
prudent potential manufacturer, the scientists at Cornell predict future mass
production, stating that because the moth's "emergence time into the adult
stage can be manipulated (lengthened) with temperature and/or other envi-
ronmental stimuli" there is a "possibility of mass producing hybrid insect
biobots and on time deployment of the insect at the target site."39
After repeated success implanting microprobes, the Cornell scientists
have coined a name for their new technology, Early Metamorphosis Insertion
Technology (EMIT), and also refer to their insertions as "part of the body" of
the "insect cyborgs."4o After inserting a microprobe, the Cornell scientists
have directed "actuation of flight muscles," which enables the scientists to
selectively control the moth's wing motion.41 Specifically, the Cornell re-
searchers found that "upstroke and downstroke actuation of 'one' or both
wings were demonstrated with power consumption of as low as 10
microWatts. By tethering the moth, we were able to affect the direction of
insect flight by controlling the motion of the wing."42
The Cornell researchers' advances have attracted worldwide attention.
Mandyam Srinivasan, professor of visual neuroscience at the University of
Queensland, Australia, visited Cornell University, where one of the scientists
told Professor Srinivasan that she was capable of steering a moth.43 In re-
sponse to this news, Professor Srinivasan advised Australia's press that "[ilt
is just a matter of time" before insect-like spies are on the way.44
Furthermore, cyborg moth technology will have a practical impact in the
real world. According to Rod Brooks, director of MIT's computer science
and artificial intelligence lab, HI-MEMS is just one of several technologies
that will soon be deployed in combat zones. 45 Dr. Brooks, who has been
working with robotic technology for over thirty years, asserts that HI-MEMS
"is going to happen. It's not science like developing the nuclear bomb, which
costs billions of dollars. It can be done relatively cheaply."46 To give a sense
of the scale of HI-MEMS technology, Dr. Brooks notes that "the DoD has
said it wants one third of all missions to be unmanned by 2015."47 In this
38. Id. at 1-2.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Bozkurt et al., supra note 31, at 1.
41. Id. at4.
42. Id.
43. Macey, supra note 5.
44. Id.
45. Richards, supra note 1.
46. Id. Dr. Amit Lal, in his HI-MEMS Proposer's Day presentation, estimated that
"low cost cyborgs" such as "Micro-UAV's (Unmanned Air Vehicles)" could be
built for $15. LAL, supra note 23.
47. Richards, supra note 1.
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regard, Brooks raises a particularly ominous prospect: "There's no doubt
their things will become weaponised, so the question [be]comes: should they
be given targeting authority?"48 Brooks thus wonders whether "it's time to
consider updating treaties like the Geneva Convention to include clauses
which regulate their use." 49
Others foresee cyborg insects being employed beyond the battlefield.
For instance, if moths could survey terrorists abroad, they could do so at
home as well. Thus HI-MEMS might be used for "homeland security appli-
cations."50 Such a prospect raises a fundamental concern, as noted by Peter
Eckersley of the Electronic Frontier Foundation: "Anyone who is just a little
bit creative can imagine both useful and nonproductive applications of re-
mote-controlled animals - especially if ordinary people will mistake them for
normal animals."51 Eckersley is concerned that if "people in a free society
have to start worrying that any insect they see might be conducting surveil-
lance, then that could seriously inhibit their ability to develop their character
and express themselves."52
III. A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLICATION:
WHAT CONSTITUTES A FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEARCH?"
However strange they seem, cyborg moths are hardly the first techno-
logical advance implicating Fourth Amendment privacy concerns. A short
history of the evolution of eavesdropping can be found in Berger v. New
York, a U.S. Supreme Court case in which the state liquor authority was
involved in a bribery conspiracy. 53 In Berger, as a result of "numerous com-
plaints" to the District Attorney's Office regarding the forced payment of
bribes for liquor license applications, officials obtained 60-day eavesdrop or-
ders to record conversations taking place in conspirators' offices.54 The de-
fendant sought to suppress the recordings that resulted from the
eavesdropping, contending that such surveillance violated the Fourth
Amendment.55
The Berger Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Clark, ultimately
held that the government wiretapping, performed pursuant to New York stat-
ute, did indeed violate the Fourth Amendment.56 Before reaching this conclu-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Christensen. supra note 6.
51. Johnson, supra note 3.
52. Id.
53. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967).
54. Id. at 45.
55. Id. at 43.
56. Id. at 44.
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sion, however, Justice Clark considered the history of eavesdropping,
recognizing it as "an ancient practice" originally involving nothing more so-
phisticated than listening "by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their
windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private discourse."5 7 The advent
of electricity enabled snoops to avoid the awkwardness and indignity of ac-
tual physical presence by intercepting messages from telegraph lines, thus
empowering newspapers to steal competitors' scoops, bettors to cheat on rac-
ing, and Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart to spy on the Union's military
communications.58 In Berger, the Supreme Court noted that "the telephone
brought on a new and more modern eavesdropper known as the 'wiretap-
per,'"59 and identified the Court's first wiretap case, Olmstead v. United
States.60
In Olmstead, the defendant was the lead conspirator of a business that
was violating the National Prohibition Act by selling as much as "200 cases
of liquor per day."61 Four federal prohibition agents who tapped the phone
lines of several conspirators obtained the information that exposed the con-
spiracy.62 The agents made the insertions into the phone lines, without tres-
passing upon any of the defendants' property, by tapping into lines from the
homes "in the streets near the houses."63 Justice Taft, writing for the Court,
found it relevant that the persons "who intercepted the projected voices
[along the phone wire] were not in the house of either party to the conversa-
tion," and thus performed no "actual physical invasion" of a house.64 The
Olmstead Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the
wiretapping in this case, and that "[t]here was no searching" because there
"was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."65
The Supreme Court adhered to its physical invasion trigger for a Fourth
Amendment search when it considered its first "bugging" case, Goldman v.
United States.66 In Goldman, an informant named Hoffman alerted govern-
ment officials that Martin Goldman was conspiring to violate the Bankruptcy
Act. 67 Two federal agents placed a "detectaphone," a device "having a re-
ceiver so delicate as, when placed against the partition wall, to pick up sound
57. Id. at 45.
58. Id. at 45-46.
59. Id. at 46.
60. Id. at 50 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 447(1928)).
61. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 457.
64. Id. at 466.
65. Id. at 464.
66. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942).
67. Id. at 130-31.
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waves originating in [the adjacent] office," against the wall next to an office
in which Hoffman was scheduled to meet with Goldman.68 The agents then
overheard the resulting conversations involving, among other participants,
Hoffman and Goldman.69 In the following prosecution, Goldman argued that
the evidence gained via the detectaphone was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.70
The Goldman Court, in an opinion by Justice Roberts, held that what the
agents heard through use of the detectaphone was "not made illegal by tres-
pass or unlawful entry" and that the government's use of the device did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.71 The defendant tried to distinguish his case
from Olmstead by arguing that when "one talks in his own office, and in-
tends his conversation to be confined within the four walls of the room, he
does not intend his voice shall go beyond those walls and it is not to be
assumed he takes the risk of someone's use of a delicate detector in the next
room."72 Justice Roberts considered such a distinction "too nice for practical
application of the Constitutional guarantee," and chose instead to adhere to
the Olmstead definition of a Fourth Amendment search, which focused on
whether trespassing had occurred.73
It would take a quarter-century for the Supreme Court to be persuaded
by the argument advanced by Goldman's lawyers. By 1967, in Katz v. United
States, the Supreme Court accepted the idea of defining a Fourth Amendment
search based on a person's intentions, or expectations.74 In Katz, FBI agents
who suspected Katz of gambling activity placed "an electronic listening and
recording device" on the outside of a public phone booth that Katz fre-
quented.75 When Katz objected to the use of the resulting recorded conversa-
tions, the litigants and lower courts framed the Fourth Amendment issue as
one of whether the government had physically penetrated a constitutionally
protected area.76
Justice Stewart, authoring the opinion, rejected the Supreme Court's
own "constitutionally protected area" formulation as deflecting attention
from the true issue at hand.77 The Katz Court found that the Fourth Amend-
ment's scope could not be delineated by "the presence or absence of a physi-
68. Id. at 131-32.
69. Id. at 132.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 134-35.
72. Id. at 135.
73. Id.
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
75. Id. at 348.
76. Id. at 349-50.
77. Id. at 351.
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cal intrusion into any given enclosure,"78 noting that "[t]he fact that the
electronic device employed . . . did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
booth can have no constitutional significance."79 Instead, the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment protected people, and not places, because "[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected."80 The government contended that any privacy interest Katz may
have had was undermined by the fact that the "telephone booth from which
[Katz] made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visi-
ble after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside."s'
Unpersuaded by this reasoning, Justice Stewart instead focused on Katz's
expectations, stating that "what [Katz] sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear."82 The Katz Court
found that an individual's right against improper police intrusion did "not
vanish when the search in question [was] transferred from the setting of a
home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a
man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures."83
It ultimately fell to Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz, to
formulate the definition of a Fourth Amendment search that has since be-
come the Supreme Court's rule. In outlining the elements for Fourth Amend-
ment protection, Justice Harlan required, "[f]irst[,] that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. "84
Furthermore, Justice Harlan explained that the ultimate issue was whether the
individual expected his words to be overheard, because "'[o]ne who occupies
it, (a telephone booth) shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that per-
mits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume' that his conversation is
not being intercepted."85
In later decisions, the Court adopted Harlan's "reasonable expectation
of privacy" definition of the Fourth Amendment in a whole host of contexts.
For instance, in Mancusi v. Deforte, the Court considered the reasonableness
of a Teamsters official's "expectation of freedom from government intru-
78. Id. at 353.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 352.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 359.
84. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. Id. (citations omitted).
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sion" in an office he shared with other union officials.86 Additionally, in
Smith v. Maryland, the Court determined whether a caller's expectation that
the numbers he dialed from his phone would remain private was "one that
society [was] prepared to recognize as reasonable."87 The Court also
weighed the reasonableness of privacy expectations of trash left in bags on
the street curb for pick up in California v. Greenwood.88 It analyzed bus
passengers' expectations that their overhead luggage would be free from ex-
ploratory squeezing by government agents in Bond v. United States.89 These
examples provide only a partial listing of the cases in which the Court has
relied on Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test to define a Fourth
Amendment search.
The Court also applied the privacy-expectation standard of Katz to radio
transmission of conversations by a government informant in United States v.
White.90 In that case, the defendant was convicted of various narcotics viola-
tions after he spoke to an informant in the defendant's home, the informant's
home, a restaurant, and the informant's car.9' Agents overheard these con-
versations through a radio transmitter hidden under the informant's
clothing.92
In assessing an individual's expectation of privacy, Justice White relied
on the old maxim that "there is no honor among thieves," because a person
"contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions
may be reporting to the police."93 Furthermore, the Court determined that a
criminal's untrsutworthiness did not somehow change with progress in sound
technology. Since "the law permits the frustration of actual expectations of
privacy by permitting authorities to use the testimony of those associates who
for one reason or another have determined to turn to the police," the law
should neither shield a criminal when those same associates have "recorded
or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove
the State's case." 94 The Court came to this conclusion despite the increased
potency of electronically recorded evidence to negatively impact a defen-
dant's case. Justice White acidly pointed out:
An electronic recording will many times produce a more reli-
able rendition of what a defendant has said than will the unaided
86. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
87. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1978).
88. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S 35, 39 (1988).
89. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000).
90. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971).
91. Id. at 746-47.
92. Id. at 747.
93. Id. at 752.
94. Id.
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memory of a police agent. It may also be that with the recording in
existence it is less likely that the informant will change his mind,
less chance that threat or injury will suppress unfavorable evi-
dence and less chance that cross-examination will confound the
testimony. Considerations like these obviously do not favor the
defendant, but we are not prepared to hold that a defendant who
has no constitutional right to exclude the informer's unaided testi-
mony nevertheless has a Fourth Amendment privilege against a
more accurate version of the events in question.95
Likewise, in United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court did not shrink
from the prospect of government use of a "beeper," a radio transmitter that
emits periodic signals that are picked up by a radio receiver.96 In Knotts, the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension learned that Knotts, together
with co-defendants Petschen and Armstrong, would attempt to buy chloro-
form, a precursor chemical used to manufacture illicit drugs such as
methamphetamine.97 With consent of the seller, the police placed a beeper
on a five-gallon container of chloroform and then, after Armstrong purchased
it, followed the car containing the chloroform, "maintaining contact by using
both visual surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from
the beeper."98 Officers followed the vehicle as it crossed from Minnesota
into Wisconsin, relying on a helicopter to pick up the beeper's signal after
losing visual contact of the car. 99 The beeper led officials to Knotts's cabin,
where a search pursuant to a warrant revealed a fully operable drug labora-
tory, as well as the drum of chloroform that Armstrong had purchased ear-
lier.OO Knotts challenged the warrantless beeper tracking as a violation of
the Fourth Amendment and sought to have the evidence of the choloroform
and methamphetamine lab suppressed.01
The Knotts Court equated the beeper surveillance with following a car
on public roads, and thus returned to its own precedent regarding the reduced
expectations of privacy in cars:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another. When [Knotts] traveled over the public
streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the
fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular di-
95. Id. at 753.
96. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 278.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 279.
101. Id.
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rection, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his
final destination when he exited from public roads onto private
property. 102
Quite simply, "[v]isual surveillance from public places" along the defend-
ants' driving route would have sufficiently revealed this information to the
police.103 That the police used existing technology in the form of a beeper
did not make the search illegal because "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment
prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon
them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded
them in this case."104
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Knotts, compared the driver
in Knotts to the telephone caller in Smith v. Maryland.105 In Smith, the gov-
ernment used a pen register to record the phone numbers that Smith dialed
from his home phone.106 The Knotts Court approvingly quoted Smith at
length:
This analysis dictates that [Smith] can claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy here. When he used his phone, [Smith] vol-
untarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone com-
pany and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the
ordinary course of business. In so doing, [Smith] assumed the risk
that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.
The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely
the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, per-
sonally completed calls for the subscriber. [Smith] concedes that if
he had placed the calls through an operator, he could claim no
legitimate expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that
a different constitutional result is required because the telephone
company has decided to automate. 07
Like Smith dialing his phone, the conspirators in Knotts assumed the risk
when driving on public streets that anyone, including the government, could
observe and collect information exposed by their activity. When the Knotts
Court considered that its holding might allow "twenty-four hour surveillance
of any citizen of this country" unrestricted by judicial oversight or permis-
sion, it deemed the risk of such a possibility to be acceptable.108
102. Id. at 282.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 283 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1978)).
106. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
107. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283.
108. Id.
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However, the Supreme Court did place an important limit on beeper
surveillance in United States v. Karo.109 The record in Karo, unlike Knotts,
indicated that government agents continued to monitor the beeper after deter-
mining that the can containing it was inside the defendant's house.I0 The
Karo case involved government intrusion of a private residence, a "location
not open to visual surveillance.""' Because the government used an elec-
tronic device to obtain "information that it could not have obtained by obser-
vation from outside the curtilage of the house," the government learned "a
critical fact about the interior of the premises that [it] ...could not have
otherwise obtained without a warrant."112 The Karo Court concluded that
"[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from pub-
lic view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the
home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight." 3
This indoor versus outdoor distinction continued to play a pivotal role in
Kyllo v. United States.] 14 In Kyllo, an agent for the United States Department
of Interior pointed a "thermal imaging device" from his car at Danny Kyllo's
private home.''5 By converting heat into visual pictures, the thermal imager
showed the agent that Kyllo's garage was "relatively hot" compared to the
rest of the house and, thus, a likely location for marijuana cultivation. 16 The
thermal imaging information formed part of the basis for a search warrant,
and the resulting search revealed an "indoor growing operation involving
more than 100 plants" of marijuana."[7 The trial court denied Kyllo's motion
to suppress evidence of the marijuana.118
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, began his analysis by identifying
the heart of the Fourth Amendment as the right of "a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."]9
Kyllo thus viewed the issue as one of protecting the sanctity of the home. The
Court found that the use of sense-enhancing technology to obtain "any infor-
109. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1983).
110. Id. at 710. In Knotts, Justice Rehnquist took care to note, "[t]he record before
us does not reveal that the beeper was used after the location in the area of the
cabin had been initially determined." Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278-79. In Karo, by
contrast, "there is no gainsaying that the beeper was used to locate the ether in
a specific house." Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
111. Karo, 468 U.S. at 710.
112. Id. at 715.
113. Id. at 716.
114. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
115. Id. at 29.
116. Id. at 29-30.
117. Id. at 30.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 31.
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mation regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,'
constituted a search,120 at least when the technology at issue was not gener-
ally used by the public.121 Repeatedly tying the privacy issue to the context
of a private dwelling, Justice Scalia worried about leaving the "homeowner
at the mercy of advancing technology."122 Scalia stated that in "the home...
all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from pry-
ing government eyes."123 The Kyllo Court, thus held that a search occurred
"[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknow-
able without physical intrusion."24 In protecting the home from thermal
imaging technology, Kyllo circled back to a concept rejected in Katz - the
physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area. Furthermore, in as-
sessing the privacy concerns posed by new technology, the Supreme Court
developed a clear distinction between expectations inside and outside of the
home.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CYBORG MOTH SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGY ON FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY
A. The HI-MEMS Cyborg Moth Technology, Under Katz's
"Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Definition of a Search,
Could Limit Fourth Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court has declared that in deciding "whether a particular
form of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a 'search' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States."125
More particularly, the Court has consistently held that application of the
Fourth Amendment depends on whether the individual seeking its protection
"can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy' that has been invaded by government action."26 Thus, the determina-
tion of a "search," and access to Fourth Amendment privacy protection, often
turns on the calculation of whether an individual's privacy expectations are
reasonable.
How reasonable is it to expect privacy from a cyborg moth? The very
consideration of the question itself seems laughable at first blush. As noted
earlier, if a friend shushed a conversation out of fear that a nearby moth
120. Id. at 34.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 35.
123. Id. at 37.
124. Id. at 40.
125. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1978).
126. Id. at 740.
2008]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
could be eavesdropping or filming for a government agency, one would be
tempted to doubt the friend's sanity. Of course, it would seem that we have
every right to reasonably expect privacy from HI-MEMS insects, or any
other animals for that matter.
However, a closer look at the Supreme Court's handling of the Katz test
could cast doubt on such an assumption of privacy. Cyborg moths are a
technological advance designed and intended to protect society from danger.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has established a track record of accepting
the government's use of technological advances in surveillance as reasonably
expected. For example, in California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court was
called upon to decide whether observations from an aircraft intruded upon a
privacy expectation that "society is prepared to honor."27 In Ciraolo, two
police officers investigated an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing mari-
juana in his backyard.128 When two fences prevented the officers from see-
ing Ciraolo's yard at ground level, the officers flew over the yard in a plane
at the navigable airspace of 1000 feet.129 From the plane, the police were
able to identify, by naked eye, marijuana plants growing as tall as ten feet.130
Ciraolo argued that the warrantless flyover violated the Fourth Amendment
because "his yard was in the curtilage of his home."131 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the Court, recognized that curtilage, the "area to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life,'" is a place "where privacy expectations are most height-
ened."32 Moreover, Chief Justice Burger agreed that Ciraolo's backyard and
his "crop" fell within the curtilage of his home. 133 Nonetheless, the Court
ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the police's aerial observa-
tions because it was unreasonable for a citizen to expect privacy from such
routinely travelled public airways.34 Society could not "honor" Ciraolo's
expectation of privacy because "[a]ny member of the public flying in this
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers
observed."135 Moreover, in "an age where private and commercial flight in
the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for [Ciraolo] to expect that
his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed
with a naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet."136
127. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986).
128. Id. at 209.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 209, 213.
131. Id. at 212.
132. Id. at 212-13 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
133. Id. at 213.
134. Id. at 215.
135. Id. at 213-14.
136. Id. at 215.
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The logic of Ciraolo undermines the reasonableness of any privacy ex-
pectation from cyborg moths. Since a pedestrian, walking where she is le-
gally allowed and using nothing more than her unaided ears, could
conceivably overhear a discussion between two friends enjoying what they
thought was a private conversation, the government could monitor the same
activity using a cyborg moth without implicating the Fourth Amendment. If
a traveler on a plane can erode the reasonableness of privacy expectations
from government observation of someone's curtilage - a place "where pri-
vacy expectations are most heightened" - then a person walking to work or
jogging for health can likewise destroy any reasonable privacy expectations
from eavesdropping cyborg moths. A picnicker in a park, shopper in a mall,
or dog walker on the beach can all lawfully observe other people. Thus, an
expectation of privacy from a moth equipped with a camera is likely
unreasonable.
What causes further alarm is the prospect that what a private individual
might do by accident or whim could pave the way for intentional government
behavior. In Ciraolo, the Court reasoned that the police were justified in
pursuing a mission aimed at peering into a particular person's backyard be-
cause a member of the flying public, by glancing out of a plane window,
could have made a similar observation.37 Following this reasoning, a bored
restaurant patron could shrink privacy expectations of other diners by choos-
ing to eavesdrop on a random conversation at the next table, opening such
talks up to government intrusion.
Moreover, the force of Ciraolo's reasoning could suggest to DARPA
that if it means to pursue its cyborg moth surveillance, the agency should
release as many of the moths and employ them as often as possible. Ciraolo
considered the reasonableness of privacy expectations to be undermined by
"routine" invasion.38 In this regard, DARPA's choice of the moth might be
quite apt since "[t]here are more species of moth than all the mammals, birds,
fish, and reptiles put together."39 The moth sentinels guarding us from ter-
rorists or criminals have such a distinct numerical advantage that they would
be able to quickly and efficiently alter privacy expectations.
As technology has advanced since Ciraolo, the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable expectation of privacy standard has retreated. In Florida v. Riley,
a sheriff's office surpassed its law enforcement brethren in California by cir-
cling over private property in a helicopter at 400 feet.140 Since helicopters
"are not bound by the lower limits of the navigable airspace allowed to other
aircraft," a plurality of the Riley court allowed the helicopter flyover, trim-
ming 600 feet off of the Fourth Amendment's reasonable privacy expecta-
137. Id. at 213.
138. Id. at 215.
139. Richard Conniff, SPINELESS WONDERS: STRANGE TALES FROM THE INVERTE-
BRATE WORLD 172 (1996).
140. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989).
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tions from Ciraolo.'4' The Riley Court's reliance on the "routine" nature of
helicopter flight might also encourage DARPA to generate as many moths as
possible. Specifically, the Court noted that there are more than 10,000 regis-
tered helicopters, both public and private, and nearly 32,000 helicopter pilots
in the United States.142 Thus, the very release of large numbers of moths
would, as afait accompli, destroy the reasonableness of privacy expectations
that people otherwise could have.
Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test, combined with a new
technology that can be cheaply mass-produced, could thus create a vicious
cycle in which each new advance in surveillance capability diminishes a per-
son's expectation of privacy. In turn, lower expectations of privacy lessen
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, thereby opening the way for
even greater technological intrusions. At some stage, especially with the ad-
vent of a particularly powerful surveillance tool such as the cyborg moth, the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches begins to col-
lapse upon itself. Continuing acceptance of technological innovation could
cause Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy formula, once devised to pro-
tect a telephone caller's privacy, to become an instrument of government
intrusion. Thus, what was once the province of the paranoid could become
the new reasonable expectation.
B. Cyborg Moth Technology, when Combined with the Court's
Focus on Privacy in the Home, Could Create a National
Bunker Mentality
The Supreme Court does not reward those who venture outside their
homes. In Knotts, when police used a beeper to set up a raid of Knotts' home,
which ultimately revealed a $10,000 amphetamine laboratory, 43 the Court
found no intrusion on "any legitimate expectation of privacy."' 44 The Court
reasoned that the conspirators had only themselves to blame for the police
learning the whereabouts of the secret operation. Because the conspirators
chose to drive a vehicle on public streets, they conveyed "to anyone who
wanted to look" the facts that the car was on a specific road, was headed in a
particular direction, was making various stops, and was telegraphing the "fi-
nal destination" by exiting "from a public road onto private property."45 If
the conspirators wished to maintain privacy in these matters, they should
141. Id. at 451. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, agreed that Riley had
no reasonable expectation of privacy, yet based her decision on the "routine"
nature of air travel rather than the fact that the aircraft viewing Riley's property
was "where it had a 'right to be."' Id. at 453.
142. Id. at 451 n.2.
143. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 279 (1983).
144. Id. at 285.
145. Id. at 281-82.
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never have left home; the government can only track the comings and goings
of those who actually come and go.
In support of this rationale, Justice Rehnquist cited Smith, where an in-
dividual, by making a telephone call, sacrificed his Fourth Amendment pro-
tection regarding the numbers he was dialing.46 When Smith dialed, he
"voluntarily conveyed numerical information," thus revealing that informa-
tion in the "ordinary course of business."' 47 By picking up the phone, he
assumed the risk that the telephone company might share the numbers en-
tered with the police.148 If Smith was serious about preserving his privacy in
the numbers he dialed, he would not use the phone.
Technological advances that enhance the government's ability to moni-
tor the activity of citizens in public have no constitutional significance. For
instance, the use of a beeper in Knotts was acceptable under the Fourth
Amendment because nothing "prohibited the police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as sci-
ence and technology afforded them in this case."' 149 Likewise, in Smith, the
Court found no danger in technology's progress because the Court was "not
inclined to hold that a different result is required because the telephone com-
pany has decided to automate."150 In White, the Court found "no persuasive
evidence that the difference . . . between the electronically equipped and the
unequipped agent is substantial enough to require discrete constitutional
recognition." 151
Following the Court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, one could
only guarantee Fourth Amendment protection from cyborg moths by ceding
public areas to them and staying indoors. Such thinking ignores the fact that
private moments often occur out in the open, with those involved expecting
human decency to prevent intrusion. For instance, a person might propose
marriage while walking on a public beach or picnicking in a state park, creat-
ing a life-long memory in a place of beauty. Another might seek a loan from
a friend over a cup of coffee in a donut shop or suburban mall, and would
cringe to think that such a personal low could be the subject of public knowl-
edge. Family members might meet at a diner or cafeteria to discuss the health
prospects of a loved one who has been hospitalized, without expecting others
to eavesdrop on the personal and painful details. Indeed, the anonymity cre-
ated by the buzz of background noise in restaurants has provided situation
comedies such as Seinfeld and Two and a Half Men with fodder for break-up
scenes in public. The theory basically is that one can end a relationship over
146. Id. at 283.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 282.
150. Id. at 283.
151. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
20081
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
dinner without other diners knowing, believing that the jilted lover will not
choose to make a public scene. Here, the understood custom is that others
will not learn of the breakup unless one of those in the dying relationship
chooses to draw attention to it by loud or indiscrete behavior.
In defiance of such norms, the Supreme Court's precedent directs peo-
ple intending such conversations to hunker down at home. Karo provided
Fourth Amendment protection against government surveillance of a beeper
signal because, once the beeper entered the home, it left the area where sur-
veillance was permitted in Knotts.15 2 The beeper told government agents
"that a particular article [was] actually located at a particular time in the
private residence."53 The distinction in Karo between the outside and inside
of a home was not accidental, for the Court explicitly noted, "[a]t the risk of
belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as justifiable."154
As previously discussed, the Court solidified the special privacy status
of the home in Ciraolo, with Chief Justice Burger recognizing the sanctity of
privacy expectations in both the home and its surrounding curtilage.155 Yet,
he found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of the home
from observations made "in a physically nonintrusive manner."156 Such lan-
guage sounds uncomfortably similar to the physical penetration language re-
jected in Katz. 57 Despite this similarity, the Court in Riley reiterated the "no
physical invasion" rationale.158 Thus, the Court has consistently allowed the
government to employ technology in monitoring citizens outside the home
and curtilage while maintaining privacy within the residence.
This dichotomy is most dramatic in cases involving cutting-edge tech-
nology, such as Kyllo, which involved thermal-imaging technology, and Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States.159 In Dow, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) used a "precision aerial mapping camera" to photograph a
Dow facility from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000 and 1,200 feet."160 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, granted the EPA, as a government agency,
"greater latitude" in conducting its warrantless inspections because Dow's
152. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1983).
153. Id. at 715.
154. Id. at 714.
155. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986).
156. Id. at 213.
157. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
158. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
159. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
160. Id.
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commercial property differed "significantly from the sanctity accorded an
individual's home."161
Most telling was the Court's discussion of the technology employed in
the case. Although the EPA conceded that the use of "highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment" that is not publicly available, such as satellite tech-
nology, might be unconstitutional without a warrant, Chief Justice Burger
concluded that the photographs in this case did not reveal such intimate de-
tails so as to raise constitutional concerns. 62 He contrasted the EPA's map-
ping camera with "some unique sensory device that, for example, could
penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversations."163 The Dow
Court was particularly concerned with the penetration of walls, and the Chief
Justice repeated that "[a]n electronic device to penetrate walls or windows so
as to hear and record confidential discussions ... would raise very different
and far more serious questions."64 In the specific context of sophisticated
surveillance technology, the Court again focused both on the importance of
the home for privacy and on penetration of walls. Dow suggests that the
Supreme Court is most receptive to privacy claims when the surveillance
actually penetrates the home.
Such analysis shows the limits of the Supreme Court's imagination
when considering privacy invasions; the justices seem incapable of envi-
sioning a violation of privacy unless the technology at issue enables the gov-
ernment to sense something hidden by a physical barrier. The Supreme
Court's inability to think beyond the tangible was shown in Kyllo, where the
Court took offense with the use of thermal-imaging technology because it
could detect heat emanating from behind the walls of a private home.165 In
Kyllo, Justice Scalia analyzed an invasion of privacy in concrete terms by
declaring that "any information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area' constitutes a search." 66 Thus, in the name of protect-
ing Fourth Amendment freedoms, the Court drew a "firm line at the entrance
of a house," congratulating itself that it had made this boundary line "not
only firm but bright."167
The cumulative impact from the Court's precedent seems clear - to gen-
uinely ensure privacy from government prying, one should "retreat into his
own home."168 To avoid beepers, planes, helicopters, high-resolution cam-
161. Id. at 237-38.
162. Id. at 238.
163. Id. at 237.
164. Id. at 239.
165. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 34 (2001).
166. Id. at 34.
167. Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 31 (citation omitted).
2008]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
eras, and thermal detectors, one should become a hermit. If you want the
government to leave you alone, go into your personal bunker.
C. Cyborg Moth Technology, Considered in Light of the Court's
"Assumption of the Risk" Precedent, Might Squelch
Interaction Among Persons in their Daily Lives
Even if a person follows the Supreme Court's suggestion to stay in her
home, such a retreat still might not provide a safe haven from government
intrusion. In White, after all, James White was in his home when Harvey
Jackson, the confidant to whom he extended his hospitality, broadcast their
conversation via a concealed radio transmitter. The sanctity of White's home
did not save him from the government's reach because he was basically a
crook betrayed by his own bad judgment.169 Justice White noted:
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he
sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very
probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.170
This rationale, in the context of criminal conspiracy, has the merit of rough
justice: if you do something unlawful, you should assume that an associate
has the same lack of scruples and will expose you.
The Supreme Court, however, has not limited its assumption of risk
analysis to wrongdoers disclosing information to co-conspirators. In Smith,
the Court deemed that Smith, in dialing numbers to place a call, "voluntarily
conveyed" and "exposed" information to a third party, thus undermining the
reasonableness of his expectation of privacy in that information.'7' No one
claimed, however, that the phone company was somehow complicit as a col-
laborator in Smith's wrongdoings. Similarly, in United States v. Miller, the
information contained in financial documents such as checks, statements, and
deposit slips was placed outside of a legitimate expectation of privacy be-
cause it was "voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employ-
ees in the ordinary course of business.172 According to the Court, a depositor
takes a risk, when revealing his financial affairs to another person, that the
other person will convey that information to the government.173 Simply
stated, the Fourth Amendment
[D]oes not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even
169. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
170. Id.
171. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
172. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
173. Id. at 443.
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if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.74
Miller could not reasonably expect privacy from his bank even though the
bank itself was in no way involved in his criminality.
Furthermore, what is true for financial documents is also true for trash.
In California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court determined that residents of
the Greenwood house were exposing their own garbage to the public when
they placed their trash on the curb, thus defeating their claims to Fourth
Amendment protection.175 The Greenwood Court came to this conclusion in
part because of the fact that the residents "placed their refuse at the curb for
the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who
might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted others,
such as the police, to do so."176 Once again, this assumption of risk of expo-
sure was not based on any character flaw of the trash collector. Nor is the
conveying of phone numbers, checks, or trash committed only by wrongdo-
ers. The Supremes Court's assumption of risk precedent effectively signals
to all citizens that sharing a secret with one person is the same as sharing it
with all persons, including the government. To confide in another is to ex-
pose private information and thus undermine the reasonableness of one's pri-
vacy expectation, and attendant Fourth Amendment protection.
Guaranteeing Fourth Amendment privacy requires an individual to always
suspect others, to shut out friends and family, and to be alone.
V. CONCLUSION
At a 2007 anti-war rally in Washington D.C.'s Lafayette Square, college
student Vanessa Alarcon heard someone say, "[o]h my god, look at those."' 177
When Vanessa looked, she responded, "[w]hat the hell is that?"178 She de-
scribed what appeared to be "kind of like dragonflies or little helicopters.
But I mean, those are not insects."' 79 A Washington lawyer was likewise
taken aback, declaring, "I'd never seen anything like it in my life. They were
large for dragonflies. I thought, 'Is this mechanical, or is it alive?"180 Per-
haps, it was a bit of both.
174. Id. (citation omitted).
175. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37, 40 (1987).
176. Id. at 40.
177. Rick Weiss, Dragonfly or Insect Spy? Scientists at Work on Robobugs, WASH.
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Jerry Louton, an entomologist at the National Museum of Natural His-
tory, surmised that the flying objects were probably just dragonflies.181 In
fact, biologists themselves think dragonflies "look about as robotic as a liv-
ing creature can look."I82Louton has gone so far as to declare that some drag-
onflies "can knock your socks off."183 Still, a few details do not make sense,
such as the fact that three observers at Lafayette Square "described a row of
spheres, the size of small berries, attached along the tails of the big dragon-
flies-an accoutrement that Louton could not explain."84 Furthermore,
some of the flyers were "maneuvering in unison," a type of behavior that is
not seen in dragonflies.85
It is certainly possible that the marchers saw robotic flyers, especially
since the Department of Defense uses nearly one hundred different models
ranging in size from a bird to a small plane. 86 These flying robots have
logged so many hours (more than 160,000 flight hours in 2006) that "the glut
of unmanned vehicles 'could render military airspace chaotic and potentially
dangerous.' "187
Whether the flyers were insects, robotic spy drones, or some combina-
tion of the two, the resulting feeling of always being watched may be in the
process of changing from unjustified suspicion into a rational concern. Once
paranoia becomes a reasonable expectation about our privacy limitations,
Fourth Amendment protection from a search, as defined in Katz, dwindles to
nothing. When the Supreme Court's precedent limits privacy protection
from technology's intrusions to those who "retreat into [their] own home,"188
a person will fear to expose her true self outside of her private residence.







187. Id. The attempt to create a fully mechanical drone the size of an insect has run
into difficulties. See Ayesa Paul et al., Surgically Implanted Micro-Platforms in
Manduca Sexta Moths, http://sonicmems.ece.cornell.edu/publications/hh06
paul.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2008) ("Over the past four decades, tremendous
interest has developed in creating cm-scale autonomous micro aerial vehicles
(MAV) for applications ranging from reconnaissance in the battlefield to envi-
ronmental monitoring ... However, the power sources for the flight of a
mechanical MAV have not scaled down well. Hence attempts by aerodynamic
and robotic engineers to create mechanical MAVs have only met with limited
success"). Thus, the HI-MEMS cyborg moth program offered scientists an op-
portunity to shrink vehicles further by relying on insects, creating a less detect-
able monitoring system.
188. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
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Supreme Court's rulings instruct her to guard her words when others come to
visit. 189 When Justice Scalia considered thermal imaging in Kyllo, he framed
the question confronting the Court as "[w]hat limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." 90 The same
question might arise again should the government employ cyborg moths.
189. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971).
190. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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